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1 Introduction
Consider a static Bayesian game (Harsanyi 1967-68) and suppose that the players can
communicate with one another and with a trustworthy mediator before choosing their
actions. Communication gives to the players the opportunity to exchange their information
and coordinate their actions. By taking advantage of these opportunities the players may
implement a larger set of outcomes.
To study the eects of communication in static games we rst need to specify the
communication channels available to the players. In other words, we need to dene an
extensive-form game which consists of two stages. In the rst one, the communication
stage, the players send and receive messages. In the second stage, the action stage, the
players choose their actions simultaneously. Once the game with communication is fully
specied, we need a solution concept to analyze it.
The notion of communication equilibrium (Myerson 1982 and Forges 1986) characterizes
the limits of what the players can achieve with communication when the solution concept
is Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). It follows from the revelation principle for Bayesian
games that any communication equilibrium outcome can be implemented with a (canonical)
game in which each player reports his type to the mediator and receives a recommendation
to play a certain action. In equilibrium, the players are sincere and obedient.
It is well understood that the notions of Nash equilibrium and BNE are not suitable
for dynamic games (such as the games with communication) because they permit the
players to behave irrationally in events that have zero probability. Clearly, these events are
not exogenous but depend crucially on the players' strategies. Therefore, in extensive-form
games it is more appropriate to use stronger solution concepts that require rational behavior
both on and o the equilibrium path. Two commonly used concepts are subgame perfect
equilibrium (Selten 1975) and sequential equilibrium (SE) (Kreps and Wilson 1982).
The goal of this paper is to analyze the eects of communication in Bayesian games
when the players are sequentially rational. We characterize the set of outcomes that the
players can achieve with communication when the solution concept is SE. We call these
outcomes strong sequential communication equilibria (SSCE).1
The rst observation is that the stronger solution concept does not make a dierence
in games with full support. These are games in which all proles of types have strictly
positive probability. Intuitively, consider a communication equilibrium of a game with
full support and the associated canonical game. Recall that this game admits a BNE in
which each player is sincere and obedient. It is immediate to see that in games with full
support sequential rationality does not impose any additional constraints. In fact, each
1The reason why we use the qualier \strong" will become apparent shortly.
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recommendation that a player receives is on path because there is a prole of types of the
opponents that has positive probability and that may have generated the recommendation.
In other words, the equilibrium in which the players announce their true types and follow
the mediator's recommendations is sequential.
We then turn to games without full support. In these games, one or more type proles
are impossible in the sense that under no circumstances will a player believe that one of
these proles have occurred. Games without full support are very common. Consider, for
example, the case in which a piece of information is common knowledge among a certain
number of players. Clearly, the prole of types under which the players have dierent
information is simply impossible.
We show that in games without full support not all communication equilibria can be
implemented with the solution concept of SE. We also demonstrate that it is not enough
to restrict attention to canonical games in which the players report their types and the
mediator sends recommendations.
The solution concept of SE requires considering sequences of strategies in which the
players tremble, i.e., make small mistakes. These sequence are used to construct consistent
beliefs. In this paper, we treat the mediator very dierently from the players. In particular,
we do not allow the mediator to tremble. When a player receives an \unexpected" message
he must believe that one or more of his opponents have deviated. Myerson (1986) considers
multistage games with communication. He also requires the players to be sequentially
rational and to hold consistent beliefs. However, in contrast to what we do in this paper,
Myerson (1986) allows the mediator to tremble. This leads to the denition of sequential
communication equilibrium (SCE).
We study the relationship between SCE and SSCE. As the names suggest, we show
that any SSCE is also an SCE. The converse is true in games with three or more players.
However, in two-person games the two concepts are not equivalent and we characterize the
set of SSCE.
The results in this paper also have implications for the implementation of SCE when
a trustworthy party is not available. Indeed, one might want to understand whether the
players could implement all SCE without any outside mediator. Our analysis provides
the rst (and missing) step in answering this question. When there are at least three
players, we show that the players are able to \replicate" the mediator's trembles. Thus,
the mediator is simply needed to guarantee that the players can coordinate their actions
without learning too much about their opponents. In Section 6 we explain that this problem
can be solved using techniques similar to those developed by the literature on unmediated
communication (see below). This implies that (under weak conditions) all SCE can be
implemented without the help of an impartial mediator.
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We have already mentioned a few important contributions to the literature on commu-
nication. This literature originated with Aumann (1974). In this article, Aumann intro-
duced the notion of correlated equilibrium which characterizes the eects of communication
in games with complete information.
Implicit in the denition of correlated and communication equilibrium is the assumption
that the players can communicate with an impartial mediator. A number of authors have
relaxed this assumption by restricting attention to unmediated communication (i.e., direct
communication among the players). Barany (1992) and Forges (1990) show that (almost)
all correlated and communication equilibria, respectively, can be implemented in Nash
equilibrium without a mediator provided that there are at least four players.
Ben-Porath (1998,2003) and Gerardi (2004) consider games with full support and adopt
the solution concept of SE. Ben-Porath (1998,2003) provides sucient conditions for the
implementation of correlated and communication equilibria in games with at least three
players. Gerardi (2004) constructs a protocol of unmediated communication that permits
to achieve (almost) all correlated and communication equilibria in games with ve or more
players.
In two-person games with complete information it is possible to implement only convex
combinations of Nash equilibria when communication is unmediated (and the players are
fully rational). Urbano and Vila (2002) assume that the two players have bounded ratio-
nality and can solve only problems of limited computational complexity. They show that
the two players are able to generate all correlated equilibria without the help of the medi-
ator. Finally, Aumann and Hart (2003) study unmediated communication in two-person
games with incomplete information. They characterize the set of outcomes that can be
implemented in BNE.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a formal description of games
with communication and dene the notion of SSCE. In Section 3, we review the notion of
SCE and Myerson's characterization in terms of codominated actions. In Section 4, we
study the relationship between the concepts of SCE and SSCE. In Section 5, we analyze
two-person games. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Bayesian Games with Communication
Let G = (T1; : : : ; Tn; A1; : : : ; An; u1; : : : ; un; p) be a nite Bayesian game. The set of players
is N = f1; : : : ; ng : Ti is the set of types of player i and T^ =
Q
i2N Ti is the set of type
proles.
We let T  T^ denote the set of proles of types that are possible, i.e., that occur
with strictly positive probability. Any prole of types that does not belong to T occurs
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with probability zero and is considered impossible by the players. In other words, under
no circumstances will the players have beliefs that assign positive probability to the type
proles outside the set T:2 We let p 2 0 (T ) denote the probability distribution of the
possible proles of types.3 Without loss of generality, we assume that every type of every
player has strictly positive probability. That is, for every i 2 N and every ti 2 Ti;
p (ti) 
X
t i2T^ i
p (t i; ti) > 0;
where T^ i =
Q
j 6=i Tj denotes the set of type proles of the players dierent from i:
The set of actions available to player i is Ai: We let A =
Q
i2N Ai denote the set of
action proles, and A i =
Q
j 6=iAj be the set of action proles of player i's opponents. The
payo function of player i is ui : T  A! R.
We say that G is a game with full support if T = T^ ; i.e., if all proles of types have
strictly positive probability. For notational convenience, when the game G does not have
full support we extend the probability distribution p to T^ by setting p (t) = 0 for every
t 2 T^nT: Similarly, for each player i 2 N; we extend the payo function ui to the set T^ A
by setting ui (t; a) = 0 for every t 2 T^nT; and every a 2 A:
An outcome of the game G is a mapping from T^ into  (A) that assigns a probability
distribution over action proles to every prole of types. Of course, we are only interested in
the outcomes associated with the type proles that are possible. However, it is convenient
to extend the domain of an outcome to the whole set of type proles T^ :
It is well known that pre-play communication expands the set of outcomes that the
players can implement. This is possible because communication allows the players to ex-
change their information and to coordinate their actions. The goal of this paper is provide
a better understanding of the benets and the limits of communication.
We therefore assume that the players can communicate with one another and with an
impartial mediator before playing the game G:We consider extensive-form games in which
the players rst exchange messages and then choose their actions (messages are \cheap"
in the sense that they do not aect directly the players' payos). Of course, there are
dierent solution concepts to analyze these extensive-form games with communication.
2For example, suppose that the types of player 1 and 2 denote the realization of a certain random
variable. Suppose also that both players observe the random variable (i.e., the realization is common
knowledge between the two players). Then player i = 1; : : : ; n will never believe that the rst two players
have dierent types.
3Given any nite set Z; we let  (Z) denote the set of probability distributions over Z: We also let
0 (Z) denote the interior of  (Z) : That is, 0 (Z) is the set of probability distributions that assign
strictly positive probability to every element of Z:
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The notion of communication equilibrium characterizes the set of outcomes of G that can
be implemented with communication when the solution concept is BNE.
Denition 1 (Communication Equilibrium) A mapping  : T^ ! (A) is a commu-
nication equilibrium of G if and only if:P
t i2bT i
P
a2A
p (t ijti) (ajt i; ti)ui (t i; ti; a) >P
t i2bT i
P
a2A
p (t ijti) (ajt i; t0i)ui (t i; ti; a i;  i (ai))
8i 2 N; 8 (ti; t0i) 2 T 2i ; 8 i : Ai ! Ai:
(1)
Consider the following game with communication. The players announce their types
to the mediator. For each prole of announcements t; the mediator randomly selects an
action prole according to the probability distribution  (t) and informs each player of his
own action. This game is usually called the canonical game. Inequality (1) guarantees that
the canonical game admits a BNE in which the players announce their types truthfully and
follow the mediator's recommendation. Clearly, this equilibrium implements the outcome
:
On the other hand, it follows from the revelation principle for Bayesian games that
if an outcome can be implemented in BNE with communication then the same outcome
can also be implemented with a canonical game and with a BNE in which the players are
sincere and obedient (see Myerson (1982) and Forges (1986)). Thus, the set of outcomes of
a Bayesian game G that can be implemented in BNE with communication is equal to the
set of communication equilibria of G. We denote this set by CE (G) :
Since games with communication are extensive-form games it is natural to consider
solution concepts stronger than BNE and require the players to be rational both on and
o the equilibrium path. In this paper, we use the solution concept of SE introduced by
Kreps and Wilson (1982).
It is obvious that the set of outcomes of G that can be implemented in SE with com-
munication cannot be larger than CE (G) : It is also easy to see that if G is a game with
full support and  is a communication equilibrium of G; then the corresponding canonical
game admits an SE in which the players are sincere and, after being sincere, they are also
obedient. Intuitively, if G has full support all the recommendations that a sincere player
can possibly receive are on path. Upon receiving a recommendation, the sincere player
cannot have an incentive to deviate since it is ex-ante optimal for him to be obedient.4 We
4Of course, a player who does not report his true type may prefer to disobey the mediator's recommen-
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conclude that in games with full support there is no dierence between implementation in
BNE and implementation in SE. If G is a game with full support, then the set of outcomes
that can be implemented in SE with communication is equal to CE (G) :
This result does not extend to games that do not have full support. The following
example (taken from Gerardi (2004)) demonstrates that not all communication equilibria
can be implemented in SE when some proles of types have zero probability.
Example 1 A communication equilibrium that cannot be implemented in SE.
Consider the following two-person game G0: The sets of types of player 1 and 2 are
T1 = ft1; v1g and T2 = ft2; v2g ; respectively. The probability of the type prole (v1; v2) is
zero. All the other type proles are equally likely. Player 1 chooses an action from the set
A1 = fa; b; cg and player 2 has no action available.
Table 1 describes the players' payos. For each combination of type prole and action,
we report the corresponding vector of payos (the rst entry denotes the payo of player
1).
t2 v2
t1
a (1; 0)
b ( 1; 0)
c (0; 2)
a (0; 0)
b ( 1; 0)
c (1; 1)
v1
a ( 1; 1)
b (1; 1)
c (0; 1)
a (0; 0)
b (0; 0)
c (0; 0)
Table 1: Payos of the game G0
Notice that in any BNE of G0; type v1 of player 1 plays action b; and type t1 chooses
either a; or c; or a randomization between the two actions.
It is easy to show that CE (G0) ; the set of communication equilibria of G0; is strictly
larger than the set of BNE outcomes of G0: A communication equilibrium that does not
belong to the set of BNE outcomes of G0 is, for example, 0 dened by:
0 (t1; t2) = 0 (v1; v2) = a; 0 (t1; v2) = c; 0 (v1; t2) = b;
dation. This, however, does not aect the incentives of a sincere player. In fact, in the SE that we are
considering a sincere player assigns probability zero to the event that his opponents lie about their types.
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where we adopt the convention of writing, for example, 0 (t1; t2) = a to denote 0 (ajt1; t2) =
1: Notice that 0 is the (unique) communication equilibrium that maximizes the expected
payo of player 1:
We now show that when the players are sequentially rational the set of outcomes that
can be implemented with communication is strictly smaller than CE (G0) : Consider an
arbitrary game with communication. Suppose that each player sends a message to the
mediator. Let Mi denote the set of messages available to player i = 1; 2: After receiving a
vector of messages (m1;m2) ; the mediator chooses a message from the set S1 (at random,
according to some probability distribution) and sends it to player 1: Finally, player 1 chooses
his action.
In this game with communication, type v1 will play action b after sending any message
m1 and receiving any message s1 (type v1 knows that his opponent is of type t2). Fur-
thermore, type t1 of player 1 will never play b (independent of player 2's type, b is strictly
dominated by a and c).
We now show that if  : T1T2 ! (A1) is an outcome of G0 that can be implemented
in SE with communication, then  (t1; t2) =  (t1; v2) : In fact, both types of player 2 prefer
action c to any other action when the type of player 1 is t1: Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exists an SE of the game with communication that induces an outcome  with
 (cjt1; t2) >  (cjt1; v2) : Then type v2 would have an incentive to deviate and mimic the
behavior of type t2 to increase the probability of c: Similarly, suppose that an SE induces an
outcome  with  (cjt1; t2) <  (cjt1; v2) : Type t2 knows that, independent of his strategy,
type v1 of player 1 will choose action b: Thus, type t2 has an incentive to mimic the behavior
of type v2 : if player 1 has type t1 the probability of action c will increase.
We therefore conclude that the set of outcomes ofG0 that can be implemented in SE with
communication coincides with the set of BNE outcomes of G0: If the players are sequentially
rational, communication cannot expand the set of outcomes that can be implemented.
As Example 1 points out, the reason why a communication equilibrium may not be im-
plementable in SE is that obedience fails to be sequentially rational after recommendations
that have zero probability. The notion of BNE allows a player to obey a recommendation
to play even a dominated action, provided that in equilibrium this recommendation occurs
with probability zero. Clearly, obedience to dominated actions can never be sequentially
rational. As this seems to suggest, the notion of SE will put some restrictions on the actions
that the mediator can possibly recommend.
Although not all communication equilibria of the gameG0 can be implemented in SE, the
revelation principle is still valid in Example 1. Clearly, any BNE of G0 can be implemented
in SE with a (trivial) canonical game in which the mediator's recommendation depends only
7
on the type announced by player 1: However, it turns out that when some proles of types
have zero probability the class of canonical games may be too restrictive. Our next example
illustrates this point. We show that by considering games with communication dierent
from the canonical ones it is possible expand the set of outcomes that are implementable
in SE.
Example 2 A communication equilibrium that cannot be implemented with the canonical
game.
G00 is a two-person Bayesian game. The sets of types of player 1 and 2 are T1 = ft1; v1g
and T2 = ft2; v2; w2g, respectively: The probability of the type prole (v1; w2) is zero.
All the other type proles are equally likely. Player 1 chooses an action from the set
A1 = fa; b; c; d; eg and player 2 has no action available.
The players' payos are described in Table 2 (the rst entry denotes the payo of player
1).
t2 v2 w2
t1
a (1; 0)
b (0; 0)
c (0; 1)
d ( 1; 0)
e ( 1; 0)
a (0; 0)
b (1; 0)
c (0; 1)
d ( 1; 0)
e ( 1; 0)
a (0; 0)
b (0; 0)
c (1; 1)
d ( 1; 0)
e ( 1; 0)
v1
a (1; 1)
b ( 2; 1)
c ( 10; 1)
d (2; 1)
e (0; 1)
a ( 2; 1)
b (1; 1)
c (2; 1)
d ( 10; 1)
e (0; 1)
a (0; 0)
b (0; 0)
c (0; 0)
e (0; 0)
f (0; 0)
Table 2: Payos of the game G00
The communication equilibrium  that maximizes the expected utility of player 1 is
unique and equal to:
 (t1; t2) = a  (t1; v2) = b  (t1; w2) = c
 (v1; t2) = d  (v1; v2) = c  (v1; w2) =
1
2
a; 1
2
b
Consider the canonical game in which the mediator selects the recommendations ac-
cording to the function : It is easy to check that there is no SE that induces : In fact,
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the outcome  can be implemented only if player 2 uses a fully revealing strategy. Thus,
suppose that player 2 reports his type truthfully. Consider type v1 of player 1: The beliefs
of type v1 over his opponent's types when he receives recommendation a must be the same
as the beliefs when he receives recommendation b: Notice however that action a is optimal
for type v1 only if the probability that player 2 has type t2 belongs to the interval [2=3; 8=9] :
On the other hand, action b is optimal for type v1 only if the probability that player 2 has
type t2 belongs to the interval [1=9; 1=3] : It follows that it cannot be sequentially rational
for type v1 to obey both the recommendation a and the recommendation b:
Consider now the following game with communication. Each player sends a message to
the mediator. The set of messages available to player 1 isM1 = T1 (i.e., player 1 announces
his type). The set of messages available to player 2 is M2 = ft2; v2; w2; m^2; ~m2g. For each
vector of messages m 2 M1 M2; the mediator randomly selects an action according to
the probability distribution  (m) 2 (A1) (see below). Then the mediator recommends
the chosen action to player 1: Finally, player 1 chooses an action from the set A1. The
mapping  :M1 M2 ! (A1) used by the mediator is given by:
 (t1; t2) = a  (t1; v2) = b  (t1; w2) = c  (t1; m^2) = a  (t1; ~m2) = b
 (v1; t2) = d  (v1; v2) = c  (v1; w2) =
1
2
a; 1
2
b  (v1; m^2) = a  (v1; ~m2) = b
This game with communication admits an SE with the following features. First, both
players announce their types truthfully. Second, after he announces his type truthfully,
player 1 obeys any recommendation.
We now construct consistent beliefs that make it sequentially rational for type v1 to
obey the recommendations a and b (it is trivial to check that all the other constraints are
satised). Suppose that along the sequence of completely mixed strategies type t2 sends
message v2 and ~m2 with probability "
2 each, and message w2 and m^2 with probability 2"
each. Type v2 sends messages t2 and m^2 with probability "
2 each, and message w2 and ~m2
with probability 2" each. Then upon receiving recommendation a (b) type v1 believes that
with probability 3=4 (1=4) player 2 has type t2: It follows that it is optimal for type v1 to
follow the recommendation.
Clearly, the SE described above implements the outcome  (notice that  (t) =  (t) for
every prole of types t 2 T1  T2).
Example 2 implies that there can be loss of generality in restricting attention to canon-
ical games when the solution concept is SE. In particular, the example emphasizes the
importance of endowing the players with sets of messages that are larger than their sets of
types. In this paper, we consider the following class of games with communication. Consider
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a Bayesian game G: A game with communication is denoted by
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

:
For every i 2 N; Mi and Si are two arbitrary nite sets of messages. Moreover:
 :M ! (S)
where M =
Q
i2NMi and S =
Q
i2N Si:
The game
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

proceeds as follows. Player i sends a message mi 2
Mi to the mediator. The players send their messages simultaneously. After receiving
the vector of messages m 2 M; the mediator randomly chooses an element s 2 S with
probability  (sjm) and sends message si to every player i 2 N: Then the players choose
their actions.5
Given a game with communication
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

; we dene the set Mi 
 Si
as follows:
Mi 
 Si = f(mi; si) 2Mi  Si :  (si; s ijmi;m i) > 0 for some (m i; s i) 2M i  S ig :
In words, a pair (mi; si) belongs to the set Mi 
 Si if and only if player i can receive
message si after reporting mi to the mediator. Thus, the set Mi
Si denotes the collection
of information sets at the action stage of each type of player i:
In the game
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

; the strategy of player i consists of the following
two functions:
Mi : Ti ! (Mi) ;
Ai : Ti  (Mi 
 Si)! (Ai) :
The function Mi species how player i chooses his message while the function 
A
i
describes how he chooses his action. We denote by i =
 
Mi ; 
A
i

player i's strategy and
by  = (i)i2N a prole of strategies. We also let 
M =
 
Mi

i2N denote the prole of
message strategies.
At the action stage player i = 1; : : : ; n has beliefs over the types of his opponents and
the messages they sent. Then he can use his opponents' action strategies to generate a
system of beliefs over their types and the actions that they will play. Notice that these are
the relevant beliefs for player i: This is because messages do not aect the players' payos
(recall that messages are cheap talk). Thus, player i's beliefs are described by the function
i : Ti  (Mi 
 Si)! (bT i  A i):
5Our approach does not depend on there being only one round of communication. If there are multiple
rounds, let Mi be player i's set of all possible strategies for sending messages over the various rounds
(conditioned at each round on the messages that i has received earlier), and let Si be the set of all possible
sequence of messages that i could receive. Also, the assumption that the sets Mi and Si are nite does not
aect any of our results and avoids a number of unnecessary technicalities.
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After announcing message mi and receiving message si; type ti assigns probability
i (t i; a ijti;mi; si) to the event that his opponents have the prole of types t i and will
choose the prole of actions a i: We let  = (i)i2N denote a prole of beliefs.
An assessment (; ) constitutes an SE of the game
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

if and only
if: (i) for every player i 2 N; the message strategy Mi is a best response to the strategy
prole  i (given Ai ); (ii) for every i 2 N; the action strategy Ai is sequentially rational
given the beliefs i; and (iii) the system of beliefs  is consistent with  in the sense that 
is the limit of the beliefs computed using a sequence of completely mixed messages strategy
proles

M;k
	1
k=1
that converges to M :
Every SE (; ) of the game
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

induces an outcome of G; i.e. a
mapping  : bT ! (A) ; in the following way:
 (ajt) =
X
m2M
 Y
i2N
Mi (mijti)
! X
s2S:(sjm)>0
 (sjm)
 Y
i2N
Ai (aijti;mi; si)
!
:
Denition 2 (Strong Sequential Communication Equilibrium) A mapping  : bT !
(A) is a strong sequential communication equilibrium (SSCE) if and only if there exists
a game with communication
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

with an SE (; ) that induces :
As mentioned above, in games with full support the set of SSCE and the set of com-
munication equilibria coincide. In the rest of the paper, we characterize the set of SSCE
for Bayesian games without full support.
3 Sequential Communication Equilibria
The fact that we require the players to be sequentially rational forces us to specify the
players' beliefs after zero probability events. The notion of SSCE is based on the original
denition of SE of Kreps and Wilson (1982). This means that only the players, but not
the mediator, are allowed to tremble. Thus, if player i follows his equilibrium message
strategy Mi and receives a zero probability message si; then he must believe that one
or more of his opponents deviated at the message stage. This, in turn, implies that we
need to specify the actions that the players choose after they deviate at the message stage.
Without specifying these actions it is not possible to check whether the action strategies
are sequentially rational.
A dierent approach is to allow also the mediator to tremble. Although the mediator
is supposed to select the messages according to some probability distribution, he can make
small mistakes. Thus, a player who receives a zero probability message can now believe
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that either his opponents deviated or that they did follow their equilibrium strategies but
the mediator made a mistake. This approach leads to the notion of SCE introduced by
Myerson (1986).
It is convenient to start the analysis with the formal denition of SCE. Then we char-
acterize the set of SCE of a Bayesian game. Finally, in the next two sections, we analyze
the relationship between SCE and SSCE.
At this point we need to introduce some additional concepts. We shall provide an
informal description of these concepts right after Denition 3.
A mediation range Q = (Qi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti is a function that assigns a set of actions
Qi (ti)  Ai to every type ti of every player i:
Let a mediation range Q = (Qi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti be given. For every type prole t 2 T^ ; we
let Q (t) =
Q
iQi (ti) : We also let the set T 
Q be equal to
T 
Q = f(t; a) : t 2 T and a 2 Q (t)g :
Further, for any type ti we let the set (T 
Q) i (ti) be dened by:
(T 
Q) i (ti) = f(t i; a i) : (t i; ti) 2 T and aj 2 Qj (tj) for j = 1; : : : ; i  1; i+ 1; : : : ; ng :
Finally, given an outcome  : bT ! (A) ; we construct the mediation range R =
(Ri (ti))i2N;ti2Ti as follows. For every i and every ti we let
Ri (ti) =
n
ai 2 Ai : 9t i 2 bT i and a i 2 A i such that  (a i; aijt i; ti) > 0o :
Intuitively, suppose that the players announce their types to the mediator and that
the mediator uses the function  to select a prole of recommendations. The set Ri (ti)
contains all the recommendations that player i could receive when he announces ti and the
other players announce types that may be dierent from their true types.
We are now ready to dene the notion of SCE.
Denition 3 (Sequential Communication Equilibrium) A mapping  : bT ! (A)
is an SCE of G if and only if (i)  is a communication equilibrium of G; and (ii) there
exist a mediation range Q = (Qi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti and a sequence of mappings fkg
1
k=1 from T
into (A) satisfying the following conditions:
Ri (ti)  Qi (ti) ; 8i 2 N; 8ti 2 Ti; (2)
k (t) 2 0 (Q (t)) ; 8t 2 T; k = 1; 2; : : : ; (3)
lim
k!1
k (t) =  (t) ; 8t 2 T; (4)
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and P
(t i;a i)2(T
Q) i(ti)
i (t i; a ijti; ai) (ui (t i; ti; a i; ai)  ui (t i; ti; a i; a0i)) > 0
8i 2 N; 8ti 2 Ti; 8ai 2 Qi (ti) ; 8a0i 2 Ai;
(5)
where i (t i; a ijti; ai) is given by:
i (t i; a ijti; ai) = lim
k!1
p (t i; ti)k (a i; aijt i; ti)P
(t0 i;a0 i)2(T
Q) i(ti)
p
 
t0 i; ti

k
 
a0 i; aijt0 i; ti
 : (6)
Fix a communication equilibrium  and consider the associated canonical game. We
know that the game admits a BNE in which the players are sincere and obedient. Clearly,
the notion of communication equilibrium does not require that a sincere player have an
incentive to obey recommendations that are o the equilibrium path. This is the additional
requirement of the notion of SCE.
Let us reconsider the canonical game. Qi (ti) denotes the set of possible recommenda-
tions that player i can receive when he announces type ti: Given a prole of reports t; the
mediator should select an action prole randomly according to the probability distribution
 (t) : However, the mediator makes mistakes and instead uses the probability distributions
k (t) (k = 1; 2; : : :). Notice, however, that when player i announces ti; the mediator never
recommends an action outside the set Qi (ti). In the limit the probability of every mistake
goes to zero.
Suppose that player i reveals his true type ti. Upon receiving a recommendation ai 2
Qi (ti) ; the player can use the sequence fkg1k=1 to compute his beliefs over his opponents'
types and recommendations. Constraint (5) guarantees that it is optimal for player i to
obey the recommendation ai provided that his opponents are sincere and obedient (upon
being sincere).
The denition of SCE does not specify the actions that the players choose after they
lie to the mediator. We can ignore those actions because implicit in the denition of SCE
is the idea that a player assigns probability zero to the event that his opponents have lied.
Notice, in fact, that any recommendation that a sincere player may receive can be explained
by actions of the trembling mediator without any deviations by the other players (recall
that Ri (ti)  Qi (ti)).6
6Notice also that it is without loss of generality to assume that a sincere player assigns probability zero
to the event that his opponents have lied to the mediator. When the players are sequentially rational
and the mediator is allowed to tremble, the set of SCE represents the largest set of outcomes that can be
implemented with communication. The basic idea is that the mediator can always replicate the players'
tremble. See Myerson (1986) for details. See also Theorem 2 below.
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We now turn to the characterization of the set of SCE of a Bayesian game. First, this
set is never empty. Clearly, the outcome induced by a BNE of any Bayesian game G is
an SCE of G. Second, any communication equilibrium  of a game with full support is
also an SCE. In fact, when T = T^ we can take the set of possible recommendations Qi (ti)
to be equal to Ri (ti) because all recommendations in R

i (ti) will indeed have positive
probability. Then constraint (5) is satised for any sequence fkg1k=1 that converges to :
In games without full support, however, communication equilibria and SCE are not
equivalent concepts. For example, the communication equilibrium described in Example 1
fails to be an SCE. Obviously, type v1 of player 1 will never obey the recommendation to
play the dominated action a:
The fact that in an SCE it has to be sequentially rational for a sincere player to obey
all recommendations clearly puts some restrictions on the messages that the mediator can
possibly send. For example, a player will never obey a recommendation to play a dominated
action. Once we rule out dominated actions, we can go one step further. A player will
never play an action that his optimal if and only if at least one of his opponents plays a
dominated action. And this process goes on. Therefore, to characterize the set of SCE it
is crucial to determine the actions that can be possible recommendations. To do this, we
need to introduce the concept of codomination (Myerson 1986).
Consider a Bayesian game G: Recall that T denotes the set of type proles of G that
have strictly positive probability.
Denition 4 (Codominated Actions) A mediation range B = (Bi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti is codom-
inated if there does not exist a probability distribution  2 (T  A) such that:P
t i:(t i;ti)2T
P
a i2A i
 (t i; ti; a i; ai) (ui (t i; ti; a i; ai)  ui (t i; ti; a i; a0i)) > 0;
8i 2 N; 8ti 2 Ti; 8ai 2 Bi (ti) ; 8a0i 2 Ai;
and X
t2T
X
i2N
X
ai2Bi(ti)
X
a i2A i
 (t; ai; a i) > 0:
Suppose that B = (Bi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti is a codominated system of actions. Let us assume
that the players report their types truthfully to the mediator and that the mediator ran-
domly selects a prole of recommendations according to some probability distribution. This
process generates a probability distribution  over the set T  A: Suppose that there is a
positive probability that a player receives a recommendation to play a codominated action.
Then it is impossible that all obedience constraints are satised. In other words, there is
at least one player who has a strictly incentive to disobey at least one recommendation.
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Although Denition 4 is rather intuitive, occasionally it will be convenient to work with
the following equivalent denition.
Denition 5 (Codominated Actions - Dual Denition) A mediation range B =
(Bi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti is codominated if there exists a vector  = (i (a
0
ijti; ai))i2N;ti2Ti;(ai;a0i)2A2i
with nonnegative components and such that:
(i) i (a
0
ijti; ai) = 0 if ai =2 Bi (ti) ;
(ii) For every t 2 T and every a 2 A; if fi : ai 2 Bi (ti)g 6= ; thenX
i2N
X
a0i2Ai
i (a
0
ijti; ai) (ui (t; a)  ui (t; a i; a0i)) < 0:
The nonnegative number i (a
0
ijti; ai) may be interpreted as the shadow price for the
incentive constraint that type ti of player i should not expect to gain by using action a
0
i
when he is told to choose action ai: If the mediator recommends a codominated action at
least to one player, then the aggregate value of the incentive constraints is negative.
As already mentioned, the two denitions of codominated systems of actions are equiv-
alent. For completeness, we state this result formally. The proof is a simple application of
the duality theorem of linear programming and is therefore omitted.
Fact 1 A mediation range B = (Bi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti is codominated according to Denition 4
if and only if it is codominated according to Denition 5.
Let B and B0 be two mediation ranges. We say that the mediation range B00 is the
union of B and B0 if for every player i 2 N and every type ti 2 Ti; B00i (ti) = Bi (ti)[B0i (ti) :
It is easy to show that if two mediation ranges are codominated, then their union is also a
codominated system of actions.7
Since the game G is nite there are nitely many codominated systems of actions. We
let E = (Ei (ti))i2N;ti2Ti denote the union of all codominated systems. In other words, E is
the maximal codominated system. We also let Q =
 
Qi (ti)

i2N;ti2Ti denote the mediation
range that remains after eliminating all codominated actions for all types of all players.
Formally, for every i 2 N and every ti 2 Ti :
Qi (ti) = AinEi (ti) :
7Suppose B and B0 are two codominated mediation ranges. Let  (0) denote the vector used in
Denition 5 to show that B (B0) is codominated. Then the vector +0 and the union of B and B0 satisfy
all the conditions of Denition 5.
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It should be emphasized that the mediation range Q is nonempty because Qi (ti) includes
all the actions that type ti of player i uses with positive probability in any BNE of the
original game G (for details, see the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
We are now ready to provide a complete characterization of the set of SCE. The following
theorem is a special case of Theorem 2 in Myerson (1986).
Theorem 1 (Myerson 1986) A communication equilibrium  is an SCE if and only if
for every i 2 N and every ti 2 Ti :
Ri (ti) \ Ei (ti) = ;:
Proof. In the appendix.
Theorem 1 reduces the problem of nding all SCE of a Bayesian game to the simpler
problem of determining the largest codominated system of actions E. Once we know E it
is easy to check whether a mapping  : bT ! (A) constitutes an SCE. In fact,  is an
SCE if and only if it satises two types of linear constraints. The rst type of constraints
guarantees that  is a communication equilibrium. The second type of constraints requires
that  assigns probability zero to any codominated action. It follows that the set of SCE
of a Bayesian game is a convex polyhedron.
4 Relationship Between the Sets of SCE and SSCE
In this section we compare the solution concepts SCE and SSCE. As their names suggest,
SSCE is a stronger solution concept than SCE. More precisely, we shall show that the
two concepts coincide in games with three or more players. However, in two-person games
without full support the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE.
Our rst result considers a Bayesian game with an arbitrary number of players. It
shows that if an outcome can be implemented with the players' trembles then it can also
be implemented with the mediator's trembles.
Theorem 2 Consider a Bayesian game G: If  is an SSCE of G then  is also an SCE
of G:
Proof. In the appendix.
The proof of Theorem 2 extends the logic of the revelation principle to the trembles.
Consider a game with communication
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

: Suppose that (; ) is an
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SE that induces the SSCE : Let

M;k
	1
k=1
denote the corresponding sequence of com-
pletely mixed message strategies. We construct a canonical game in which the players
announce their types to the mediator. Then the mediator uses the strategies M to deter-
mine the messages that the players would send in equilibrium. In this stage of the game,
however, the mediator can make small mistakes and choose the wrong messages. We use
the sequence

M;k
	1
k=1
to determine the probability of these mistakes. Moreover, the me-
diator uses the function  and the equilibrium strategies A to determine the actions to
recommend to the players. In this stage of the game the mediator does not tremble.
The fact that the mediator trembles according to the probability distributions

M;k
	1
k=1
and the strategies Ai ; : : : ; 
A
n are sequentially rational implies that it is in the best interest
of every player to obey all possible recommendations (even those that have zero probabil-
ity).
We now investigate whether the opposite of Theorem 2 holds. Is it possible to implement
an SCE when only the players but not the mediator tremble? The answer is armative
provided that there are at least three players.
Theorem 3 Consider a Bayesian game G with n > 3 players. If  is an SCE of G then
 is also an SSCE of G:
Proof. In the appendix.
We now provide an informal description of the proof and explain why it requires at least
three players. Given an SCE ; we construct a game with communication and an SE that
induces :
We require that the game with communication is nite in the sense that the sets of
messages available to the players and to the mediator contain nitely many elements. This
requirement forces us to establish a preliminary result which we now describe. Given an
SCE ; the players' beliefs are derived from the innite sequence fkg1k=1 converging to .
We show that it is possible to generate the same beliefs by specifying only nitely many
mappings from T into  (A) : More precisely, given fkg1k=1 we construct a nite sequence
of mappings f~1; : : : ; ~Lg such that: (i) ~1 (t) =  (t) for every type prole t 2 T . (ii)
Suppose that the mediator uses the function ~`; ` = 2; : : : ; L; with probability "
` 1 and
the function ~1 =  with the remaining probability. Then as " goes to zero these trembles
generate exactly the same beliefs as the original sequence fkg1k=1 (see the proof for details).
Our game with communication is as follows. The message that each player sends to the
mediator has two components. In particular, each player i announces his type and a number
in f1; : : : ; Lg ; where L is the length of the sequence f~1; : : : ; ~Lg dened above. Suppose
that the players report the prole of types t: If t is not an element of T then the mediator
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selects a prole of recommendations (i.e., a prole of actions) according to the probability
distribution  (t) : Suppose now that t belongs to T , and let ~`= 1; : : : ; L denote the second
largest integer announced by the players (or the largest integer if this is announced by two
or more players). In this case, the mediator selects a prole of recommendation according
to the probability distribution ~~`(t) dened above.
In equilibrium, every player is sincere (i.e., announces his type truthfully) and reports
the number one. Moreover, a sincere player obeys every recommendation (both when he
reports the number one and when he announces a number larger than one). The fact
that  is a communication equilibrium and that it takes at least two players to induce the
mediator to ignore  implies that no player has an incentive to deviate at the message
stage. It remains to show that it is sequentially rational for a sincere player to obey all
recommendations.
We consider a sequence of completely mixed message strategies that converge to the
equilibrium strategies and satisfy the following two properties: (i) if z0i > zi > 2; then it is
much more likely that player i is sincere and announces zi than he is sincere and announces
z0i. In other words, sincere players are more likely to announce small integers. (ii) The
deviations in which a player lies about his type are much less likely than the deviations in
which the player is sincere. In particular, we assume that it is more likely that two players
are sincere and announce two arbitrary numbers than a single player lies about his type.
The two properties mentioned above have the following important implication. The
beliefs of a sincere player are identical to the beliefs derived from the mediator's trembles.
Then it follows from the denition of the SCE  that it is optimal for the player to obey
every recommendation he receives. It is important to emphasize that this holds even when
the sincere player announces a number dierent from one.
At this point it should also be clear why our proof requires three or more players.
Suppose that n = 2: Suppose also that player 1 is sincere, announces the number one and
receives a recommendation that has zero probability when player 2 follows the equilibrium
strategy. What should player 1 believe? It must be the case that player 2 has lied about his
type. The beliefs derived from the mediator's trembles are of no use in this case. Clearly,
this problem does not arise with three or more players. In fact, each player can believe
that two of his opponents were sincere but announced a number dierent from one.
5 Two-Person Games
Theorem 3 does not cover the case n = 2: It is clear that the logic of our proof does not
apply when there are only two players. However, at this point it is still an open question
whether there is any dierence between SCE and SSCE for n = 2: Our next example
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answers this question. We construct a two-person Bayesian game with the set of SSCE
strictly included in the set of SCE.
Example 3 Theorem 3 does not hold for n = 2:
~G is a two-person Bayesian game. The sets of types of player 1 and 2 are T1 = ft1; v1g
and T2 = ft2; v2; w2g, respectively. The probability of the type prole (v1; w2) is zero.
All the other type proles are equally likely. The sets of actions of player 1 and 2 are
A1 = fa; b; cg and A2 = fd; eg ; respectively. The players' payos are described in Table 3
(the rst entry denotes the payo of player 1).
t2 v2 w2
t1
d e
a 2; 2  3; 1
b  2; 0 1; 1
c 0; 1 0; 0
d e
a 0; 10 0; 11
b 0; 1 2; 1
c 0; 3 0; 3
d e
a  2; 0 1; 1
b 0; 1 0; 0
c 2; 2  3; 0
v1
d e
a 0; 0  1; 1
b 2; 2 0; 1
c 1; 1 1; 0
d e
a  1; 1 2; 3
b 1; 0 1; 0
c 0; 1 2; 1
d e
a 0; 0 0; 0
b 0; 0 0; 0
c 0; 0 0; 0
Table 3: Payos of the game ~G
We claim that the SCE  that maximizes the expected payo of player 1 is unique and
equal to:
 (t1; t2) = (a; d)  (t1; v2) = (b; e)  (t1; w2) = (c; d)
 (v1; t2) = (b; d)  (v1; v2) = (c; e)  (v1; w2) = (a; d)
where we write, for example,  (t1; t2) = (a; d) for  ((a; d) j (t1; t2)) = 1:
Obviously it is impossible to do better than  since player 1 obtains the highest possible
payo in every single state. It is also easy to verify that  is a communication equilibrium.
To prove that it is also sequential, we need to demonstrate that type v1 of player 1 has an
incentive to obey the recommendation to play action a: Consider the following mediation
range Q:
Q1 (t1) = Q1 (v1) = fa; b; cg ;
Q2 (t2) = Q2 (w2) = fdg ; Q2 (v2) = feg :
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The mediator's trembles are described by a (converging) sequence fkg1k=1 that satises:
k ((a; d) j (v1; t2)) = 1k2 k ((a; e) j (v1; v2)) = 1k :
for k = 1; 2; : : : :
It follows that 1 (v1; a) ; the beliefs of type v1 when he is sincere and receives a; assign
probability one to the event that player 2 has type v2 and will play action e: This, in turn,
implies that action a is optimal for type v1 and that  is an SCE.
Suppose now that 0 is a communication equilibrium under which player 1 obtains his
highest payo in every state. Then 0 ((a; e) j (v1; v2)) = 0: If not, type v2 would have an
incentive to deviate and play d: Moreover,
0 ((a; d) j (v1; w2)) + 0 ((a; e) j (v1; w2)) = 1;
otherwise type v2 would have an incentive to lie to the mediator and report message w2:
Notice that action e is strictly dominated for type w2: Therefore, in any SCE w2 must receive
the recommendation to play d: This shows that  is the unique SCE that maximizes the
expected payo of player 1:
We now demonstrate that  is not an SSCE of ~G: By contradiction, suppose that there
exists a game with communication (G;M1;M2; S1; S2; ) and an SE (; ) that induces :
Let Si (mi) denote the set of messages that player i could receive when he announces mi
and his opponent announces an arbitrary message:
Si (mi) = fsi 2 Si :  (si; s ijmi;m i) > 0 for some (m i; s i) 2M i  S ig :
Furthermore, for every i = 1; 2 and every type  i 2 Ti; let M^i ( i) be the set of messages
used in equilibrium by  i :
M^i ( i) =

mi 2Mi : Mi (mij i) > 0
	
:
Notice that the sets M^2 (t2) ; M^2 (v2) and M^2 (w2) must be pairwise disjoint otherwise
the SE (; ) cannot induce . Moreover, the SE (; ) must satisfy the following condition.
Consider m1 2 M^1 (v1), m2 2 M^2 (w2) ; and (s1; s2) such that  (s1; s2jm1;m2) > 0: Then
A1 (ajv1;m1; s1) = 1:
If the above equality fails, type v2 of player 2 has an incentive to deviate and choose a
message from the set M^2 (w2) (and then play action d).
Consider now a pair (m^1; s^1) such that m^1 2 M^1 (v1) ; s^1 2 S1 (m^1) and A1 (ajv1; m^1; s^1) >
0: Obviously, it is sequentially rational for type v1 to play action a only if he certain that
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his opponent is of type v2 and will play action e: Formally, we have 1 (v2; ejv1; m^1; s^1) = 1:
This, in turn, implies that there must be a pair (m^2; s^2) such that: (i)  (s^1; s^2jm^1; m^2) > 0;
and (ii) A2 (ejv2; m^2; s^2) > 0: Suppose now that type v2 of player 2 sends message m^2
and receives s^2: We claim that he must assign positive probability to the pair (v1; a) :
2 (v1; ajv2; m^2; s^2) > 0: This follows from the fact that m^1 2 M^1 (v1),  (s^1; s^2jm^1; m^2) > 0
and A1 (ajv1; m^1; s^1) > 0: But we have now reached a contradiction. In fact, A2 (ejv2; m^2; s^2)
must be equal to zero when 2 (v1; ajv2; m^2; s^2) > 0 because action e is optimal for type v2
if and only if player 1 puts probability zero on action a:
The example above shows that when there are two players it makes a dierence whether
or not we assume that the mediator can make mistakes. Now that we know that the
concepts of SSCE and SCE are not equivalent, we face the problem of characterizing the
set of SSCE for n = 2. This problem is complicated by the fact that the class of games
with communication to consider is potentially extremely large. In fact, we have already
demonstrated in Example 2 that not all SSCE can be implemented with a canonical game.
In some cases the set of messages that a player can send to the mediator must be larger
than his set of types. It would therefore be useful to put some restrictions on the games
that it is necessary to analyze. In what follows, we develop a simple procedure that allows
us to nd all SSCE of a Bayesian game with two players.
Consider a two-person Bayesian game G = (T1; T2; A1; A2; u1; u2; p) : Without loss of
generality, we assume that each player i = 1; 2 has at least one action available and dene
ni = jTi j (jAij   1). In the rest of the section, we use i to denote an arbitrary player and
j to denote his opponent.
Our goal is to construct a class of games with communication in which all SSCE can be
implemented. We let Mi denote the set of messages available to player i: We assume that
Mi is equal to:
Mi = Ti  f0; 1; : : : ; njg ; (7)
with an arbitrary element denoted by mi = (ti; zi) :
The product set M1 M2 will not play any role in our analysis. Instead, we shall often
consider the set of pairs of messages in which at least one player announces the number
zero. We use M to denote this set. Thus, we have:
M =
n
(ti; zi)i=1;2 2 M1  M2 : zi = 0 for some i = 1; 2
o
: (8)
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Throughout the section we let  denote an arbitrary function from M into the set  (A) :
Given a function ; we construct the set Pi () ; i = 1; 2; as follows:
Pi () = f(ti; ai) 2 Ti  Ai :
P
tj2Tj
P
aj2Aj
p (ti; tj)  (ai; ajj (ti; 0) ; (tj; 0)) = 0 andP
mj2 Mj
P
aj2Aj
 (ai; ajj (ti; 0) ;mj) > 0g:
Intuitively, suppose that the players send their messages to the mediator who then
selects a pair of recommendations (actions) randomly, according to . Suppose also that
each player is expected to announce his type truthfully (i.e., to be sincere) and to report the
number zero. For brevity, we refer to this behavior as \correct" behavior. A pair (ti; ai)
belongs to the set Pi () if ai is an \unexpected" recommendation for type ti when he
behaves correctly. That is, ai is a recommendation that ti can receive only if his opponent
behaves incorrectly.
We say that a function  : M ! (A) is admissible if the following condition holds.
For each pair (ti; ai) 2 Pi () ; i = 1; 2; there exists a triple (tj; zj; aj) 2 Mj Aj such that8
p (ti; tj)  (ai; ajj (ti; 0) ; (tj; zj)) > 0:
Notice that there are two dierent forms of incorrect behavior. A player can either lie
about his type, or the player can reveal his type truthfully and choose a number dierent
from zero. The fact that  is admissible has the following implication. If type ti behaves
correctly and receives the unexpected recommendation ai; then he is not forced to believe
that the opponent lied about his type. It is conceivable that the opponent revealed his true
type and announced a strictly positive integer.
Clearly, to describe what a player should believe after receiving an unexpected rec-
ommendation we need to derive a consistent system of beliefs. This, in turn, requires
considering the players' trembles. Thus, we now introduce a pair of functions f = (f1; f2)
with:
fi : Ti  f1; : : : ; njg ! f1; : : : ; njjTijg :
It is useful to think at the function fi in the following way. Consider two pairs (ti; zi)
and (t0i; z
0
i) ; where both zi and z
0
i are dierent from zero. If fi (ti; zi) < fi (t
0
i; z
0
i) then it is
much more likely that type ti sends (ti; zi) than type t
0
i sends (ti; zi) : If fi (ti; zi) = fi (t
0
i; z
0
i)
then the probabilities of the two mistakes converge to zero at the same speed.
Given an admissible function  and a pair of functions f = (f1; f2) we construct the
systems of beliefs as follows. Fix a pair (ti; ai) in the set Pi () : We let i (jti; ai; ; f) 2
8Clearly, zj must be dierent from zero.
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(Tj  Aj) denote the following probability distributions over the types and actions of
player j. Consider a pair (tj; aj) 2 Tj  Aj: We need to distinguish among dierent cases.
First, suppose that there exists zj = 1; : : : ; ni such that: (i)
p (ti; tj) 
 
ai; ajj (ti; 0) ;
 
tj; z

j

> 0;
and (ii) for every triple
 
t0j; z
0
j; a
0
j

with
p
 
ti; t
0
j


 
ai; a
0
jj (ti; 0) ;
 
t0j; z
0
j

> 0
(notice that z0j > 0) we have
fj
 
tj; z

j

6 fj
 
t0j; z
0
j

:
In this case, i (tj; ajjti; ai; ; f) is set equal to:
i (tj; ajjti; ai; ; f) =
p (tj; ti)
P
zj2f1;:::;nig:
fj(tj ;zj)=fj(tj ;zj )
 (ai; ajj (ti; 0) ; (tj; zj))
P
(t0j ;zj)2Tjf1;:::;nig:
fj(t0j ;zj)=fj(tj ;zj )
p
 
t0j; ti
 P
a0j2Aj

 
ai; a0jj (ti; 0) ;
 
t0j; zj
 : (9)
In all other cases, we set i (tj; ajjti; ai; ; f) equal to zero.
Implicit in the construction of our beliefs is the idea that the deviations in which a
player lies about his type are much less likely than the deviations in which the player is
sincere and announces a number dierent from zero. Recall that  is admissible and, thus,
there is nothing that reveals to a player who behaves correctly that his opponent was not
sincere. We use the functions f1 and f2 to determine the most likely deviations and to
compute the players' beliefs.
We are now ready to state our nal result.
Theorem 4 Consider a two-person Bayesian game G: A mapping  : T^ ! (A) is an
SSCE of G if and only if there exist an admissible function  and a pair of functions
f = (f1; f2) such that:
(i)  ((t1; 0) ; (t2; 0)) =  (t1; t2) for every (t1; t2) 2 T^ ;
(ii) For every i = 1; 2; ti 2 Ti; mi 2 Mi; and  i : Ai ! Ai;P
tj2Tj
P
a2A
p (ti; tj)  (aj (ti; 0) ; (tj; 0))ui (ti; tj; a) >P
tj2Tj
P
a2A
p (ti; tj)  (ajmi; (tj; 0))ui (ti; tj;  i (ai) ; aj) ;
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(iii) For every i = 1; 2; ti 2 Ti; zi = 1; : : : ; nj; and  i : Ai ! Ai;P
tj2Tj
P
a2A
p (ti; tj)  (aj (ti; zi) ; (tj; 0))ui (ti; tj; a) >P
tj2Tj
P
a2A
p (ti; tj)  (aj (ti; zi) ; (tj; 0))ui (ti; tj;  i (ai) ; aj) ;
(iv) For every i = 1; 2; (ti; ai) 2 Pi () ; and a0i 2 Ai;P
tj2Tj
P
aj2Aj
i (tj; ajjti; ai; ; f)ui (ti; tj; ai; aj) >P
tj2Tj
P
aj2Aj
i (tj; ajjti; ai; ; f)ui (ti; tj; a0i; aj) ;
where i (tj; ajjti; ai; ; f) is as in equation (9).
Proof. In the appendix.
Consider the game with communication in which player i sends a message in Mi and
receives a recommendation in Ai: The mediator chooses the recommendations according to
: Notice that  is not dened for a pair of messages (m1;m2) that does not belong to M
(that is, when both players report a number dierent from zero). As we shall see, in this
case the value of  is irrelevant and can be chosen arbitrarily.
Suppose that conditions (ii)-(iv) are satised. It is easy to verify that the game just
described admits an SE in which each player reveals his type truthfully and reports the
number zero. Moreover, after sending message (ti; 0), type ti obeys all recommendations,
both those that are expected (i.e., those that have positive probability when the opponent
is sincere and announces the number zero) and those that are unexpected. Type ti also
obeys any expected recommendation if he mistakenly sends message (ti; zi) with zi > 0:
Another feature of the SE is that a correct player never assigns positive probability to the
event that the opponent lied about his type.9
We conclude that the existence of a pair (; f) satisfying conditions (i)-(iv) is sucient
for an outcome  to be an SSCE.
On the other hand, Theorem 4 states that conditions (i)-(iv) are also necessary. In the
proof, we show that any SSCE of a two person game can be implemented with the game
and the SE that we have illustrated above.
9Recall that a player is correct if he reveals his type truthfully and announces the number zero.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze games with communication under the assumption that players
behave rationally in all events, including those that have zero probability. We show that
this assumption has crucial implications on the eects of communication when the players
believe that some type proles are impossible. We dene the notion of SSCE and show
that it coincides with the concept of SCE in games with at least three players.
The concept of SSCE assumes that the players can communicate with a trustworthy
mediator, although the mediator is not required to tremble. Using techniques from Gerardi
(2004) it is possible to show that, under some weak conditions, the mediator is completely
superuous. In particular, suppose that the game has at least ve players. An SSCE  is
rational if for every action prole a 2 A and every type prole t 2 T^ the probability  (ajt)
is a rational number. Then any convex combination of rational SSCE can be implemented
in SE with unmediated communication. Notice that in games with rational parameters any
SSCE can be expressed as a convex combination of two or more rational SSCE.10
We also show that in two-person games the concepts of SCE and SSCE do not coincide.
We provide a characterization of the set of SSCE in games with two players. Perhaps,
the complexity of the analysis when the mediator's trembles are not allowed suggests that,
for most applications, it may be simpler to admit the possibility that the mediator makes
mistakes and use the concept of SCE.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof is based on a series of Lemmata.
Lemma 1 Consider an SCE : Let Q = (Qi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti and fkg
1
k=1 denote the mediation
range and the sequence of mappings from T into (A), respectively, that satisfy constraints
(3)-(5). Suppose that B = (Bi (ti))i2N;ti2Ti is a codominated mediation range. Then for
every i 2 N and every ti 2 Ti :
Qi (ti) \Bi (ti) = ;:
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that the claim is false. Then the set
X = f(t; a) 2 T 
Q : ai 2 Bi (ti) for some i 2 Ng
10A Bayesian game G has rational parameter if for every i 2 N; every t 2 T , and every a 2 A; the
numbers p (t) and ui (t; a) are rational. Notice also that if the game has irrational parameters, then any
point in the interior of the set of SSCE can be expressed as a convex combination of two or more rational
SSCE.
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is nonempty.
Given any pair (t; a) 2 X; we let  (t; ajX) be dened by:
 (t; ajX) = lim
k!1
p (t)k (ajt)P
(t0;a0)2X
p (t0)k (a0jt0)
:
Also, for any pair (ti; ai) with ti 2 Ti and ai 2 Qi (ti) ; we let  (ti; aijX) be dened by:
 (ti; aijX) = lim
k!1
P
(t i;a i):(t i;ti;a i;ai)2X
p (t i; ti)k (a i; aijt i; ti)P
(t0;a0)2X
p (t0)k (a0jt0)
:
Notice that  (t; ajX) and  (ti; aijX) are well dened sinceX is nonempty, and for every
k and every t0 2 T the probability distribution k (t0) assigns strictly positive probability
to any action prole in Q (t0) :
Let  be the vector of nonnegative weights used in Denition 5 to demonstrate that B
is a codominated system of actions. Recall that i (a
0
ijti; ai) = 0 if ai =2 Bi (ti) :
Consider the following weighted sum of the obedience constraints:
y =
P
i2N
P
ti2Ti
P
ai2Qi(ti)
P
a0i2Ai
f (ti; aijX)i (a0ijti; ai)P
(t i;a i)2(T
Q) i(ti)
i (t i; a ijti; ai) (ui (t i; ti; a i; ai)  ui (t i; ti; a i; a0i))g
where i (t i; a ijti; ai) is dened in equation (6).
The variable y is nonnegative since Q and fkg1k=1 satisfy constraints (3)-(5). Notice
that y can be expressed as follows:
y =
P
(t;a)2X
P
i2N
(
 (ti; aijX) i (t i; a ijti; ai)
P
a0i2Ai
i (a
0
ijti; ai) (ui (t; a)  ui (t; a i; a0i))
)
=P
(t;a)2X
 (t; ajX)P
i2N
P
a0i2Ai
i (a
0
ijti; ai) (ui (t; a)  ui (t; a i; a0i)) < 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that X is nonempty, B is a codominated system
and  is the corresponding vector of weights. We therefore reach a contradiction and the
proof of the lemma is complete.
Lemma 2 There exist two mediation ranges, B and Q; and a sequence fkg1k=1 of proba-
bility distributions over T 
Q such that:
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(i) B is a codominated system;
(ii) For every i 2 N and every ti 2 Ti :
Qi (ti) = AinBi (ti) ;
(iii) For every k = 1; 2; : : : ; k 2 0 (T 
Q) ;
(iv) For every i 2 N; for every ti 2 Ti; for every ai 2 Qi (ti) ; and for every a0i 2 Ai :X
(t i;a i)2(T
Q) i(ti)
 (t i; a ijti; ai) (ui (t i; ti; a i; ai)  ui (t i; ti; a i; a0i)) > 0
where  (t i; a ijti; ai) is given by:
 (t i; a ijti; ai) = lim
k!1
k (t i; ti; a i; ai)P
(t0 i;a0 i)2(T
Q) i(ti)
k
 
t0 i; ti; a
0
 i; ai
 :
Proof. Fix a (mixed-strategy) BNE  = (1; : : : ; 

n) of the game G: 

i denotes the
equilibrium strategy of player i and i (ti) 2 (ti) is the probability distribution (over the
set Ai) chosen by type ti: Let B
0
i (ti)  Ai denote the (possibly empty) set of actions that
do not belong to the support of i (ti) : Let also Q
0
i (ti) = AinB0i (ti). Given these sets,
we construct the mediation ranges Q0 = (Q0i (ti))i2N;ti2Ti and B = (B
0
i (ti))i2N;ti2Ti : Let 
denote the probability distribution over the set T  A given by:
 (t; a) = p (t)
Y
i2N
i (aijti) :
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that B0 is a codominated system of
actions. In this case, we set Q = Q0 and
k (t; a) =  (t; a) ; (10)
for every (t; a) 2 T 
 Q0; and for every k = 1; 2; : : :. The mediation range Q and the
constant sequence fkg1k=1 dened above clearly satisfy condition (iv) of Lemma 2 and the
proof is complete.
We now turn to the second case and assume that B0 is not a codominated system. We
show that there exists a nite sequences of mediation ranges

B1; : : : ; BH
	
satisfying the
following properties. First, BH is a codominated system. Second, Bhi (ti)  Bh 1i (ti) for
every i 2 N; ti 2 N; and h = 1; : : : ; H: Finally, consider any h = 1; : : : ; H and construct the
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mediation range Qh by letting Qhi (ti) = AinBhi (ti) : There exists a probability distribution
h 2 (T  A) such that:
h (t; a) = 0; 8 (t; a) =2 T 
Qh; (11)
and P
(t i;a i)2(T
Qh) i(ti)
h (t i; ti; a i; ai) > 0;
8i 2 N; 8ti 2 Ti 8ai 2 Bh 1i (ti) nBhi (ti) :
(12)
The sequences

B1; : : : ; BH
	
and

1; : : : ; H
	
are constructed inductively as follows.
If Bh 1 is not a codominated system, then there exists a probability distribution h 2
(T  A) such that
P
t i:(t i;ti)2T
P
a i2A i
h (t i; ti; a i; ai) (ui (t i; ti; a i; ai)  ui (t i; ti; a i; a0i)) > 0;
8i 2 N; 8ti 2 Ti 8ai 2 Bh 1i (ti) ; 8a0i 2 Ai;
(13)
and X
t2T
X
i2N
X
ai2Bh 1i (ti)
X
a i2A i
h (t; ai; a i) > 0:
We let the set Bhi (ti) be equal to:
Bhi (ti) =

ai 2 Bh 1i (ti) : h (t i; ti; a i; ai) = 0 8 (t i; a i) s.t. (t i; ti; a i; ai) 2 T  A
	
:
It is easy to check that Bh and h satisfy conditions (11) and (12).
In this construction, the nonnegative integer
P
i2N
P
ti2Ti
jBhi (ti) j is strictly decreasing
in h: Thus, the construction must terminate at a codominated system.
Let B = BH and the mediation range Q be dened by Qi (ti) = AinBi (ti) for every
i and every ti: We now construct the sequence fkg1k=1 of probability distributions over
T 
Q (with full support). For every k = 1; 2; : : : ; and every (t; a) 2 T 
Q let
k (t; a) =  (t; a) +
HX
h=1

1
k
h
h (t; a) +

1
k
H+1
;
and
k (t; a) =
k (t; a)P
(t0;a0)2T
Q
k (t0; a0)
: (14)
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It remains to demonstrate that condition (iv) of Lemma 2 is satised. If ai 2 Q0i (ti),
then the beliefs  (jti; ai) of type ti of player i are derived from the probability distribution
: In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint is satised since  is the probability
distribution induced by a BNE of the game G: On the other hand, if ai 2 Qhi (ti) nQh 1i (ti)
for some h = 1; : : : ; H; then the beliefs  (jti; ai) of ti are derived from the probability
distribution h: This is because the event (ti; ai) has strictly positive probability under 
h
and zero probability under h
0
for every h0 < h: In this case, the incentive compatibility
constraint follows from inequality (13). This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 3 Let B and Q be the two mediation ranges dened in Lemma 2. Recall also that
E is the maximal codominated system and the mediation range Q is dened by Qi (ti) =
AinEi (ti) : Then B = E and Q = Q:
Proof. B is a codominated system and Bi (ti) = AinQi (ti) for every i 2 N and every
ti 2 Ti: It follows from Lemma 1 that the set Qi (ti) does not contain any codominated
action. Thus B must be equal to the maximal codominated system E:
Proof of the theorem
Suppose that  is an SCE and Q is the associated mediation range. Lemma 1 implies
that for every i and every ti; Qi (ti)\Ei (ti) = ;: Recall that Ri (ti)  Qi (ti) (see condition
(2)). Thus, Ri (ti) \ Ei (ti) = ;:
Conversely, suppose that  is a communication equilibrium and Ri (ti) \ Ei (ti) = ;:
The last condition implies that Ri (ti)  Qi (ti) for every i and ti: Consider now a type
prole t 2 T and x an action prole at 2 A such that  (atjt) > 0: For every k = 1; 2; : : : ;
let
^k (ajt) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if a =2 Q (t) 
1  1
k

 (ajt) + 1
k
k(t;a)
p(t)
if a 2 Q (t) and a 6= at
1  P
a 6=at
^k (ajt) if a = at
(15)
where k (t; a) is dened in equation (10) or (14).
11
It is clear that there exists an integer k such that for every k > k and for every t 2 T;
^k (t) 2 0
 
Q (t)

. Moreover, for every t; limk!1 ^k (t) =  (t). In other words, the
mediation range Q and the sequence of functions f^kg1k=k satisfy conditions (3) and (4) of
Denition 3.
11Lemma 3 guarantees that the mediation range Q and the mediation range Q dened in Lemma 2
coincide.
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It remains to show that Q and f^kg1k=k satisfy condition (5). Consider a pair (ti; ai)
with ti 2 Ti and ai 2 Qi (ti) : There are two cases to consider. First, suppose thatX
t i2bT i
X
a i2A i
p (t ijti) (a i; aija i; ai) > 0: (16)
In this case, the beliefs i (jti; ai) are derived from and the mapping  (and the prob-
ability distribution p). Condition (5) holds since  is a communication equilibrium.
Suppose now that the left hand side of inequality (16) is equal to zero. Then the beliefs
i (jti; ai) are derived from the sequence fkg1k=k : Lemma 2 guarantees that condition (5)
is satised.
Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that  is an SSCE of the Bayesian game G: We let (; ) denote the SE of the
game with communication
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

that induces : We also let

M;k
	1
k=1
denote the sequence of completely mixed message strategy proles that converges to M
and that is used to compute the system of beliefs :
We now construct a mediation range Q and a sequence of mappings fkg1k=1 from T
into  (A) and show that the triple (;Q; fkg1k=1) satises all the conditions of Denition
3. For every i 2 N; and every ti 2 Ti; let Qi (ti) be dened by:
Qi (ti) =

ai 2 Ai :  (sjm)Ai (aijti;mi; si) > 0 for some (m; s) 2M  S
	
:
It can be easily veried that Ri (ti)  Qi (ti) for every i and every ti.
Let f"kg1k=1 be a sequence of positive numbers such that for every t = (t1; : : : ; tn) 2 T
and every m = (m1; : : : ;mn) 2M :
lim
k!1
"kQ
i2N
M;ki (mijti)
= 0:
The function k : T ! (A) ; k = 1; 2; : : : ; is dened as follows. For every t 2 T and
every a 2 Q (t) we let
k (ajt) =
P
m2M
Q
i2N
M;ki (mijti)
 P
s2S:(sjm)>0
 (sjm)
Q
i2N
Ai (aijti;mi; si)

+ "k
1 + jQ (t) j"k : (17)
It follows that k (t) 2 0 (Q (t)) for every t and every k and limk!1 k (t) =  (t) for
every t:
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To complete the proof we need to check condition (5). For every i 2 N; ti 2 Ti; and
ai 2 Qi (ti) ; let the set Di (ti; ai) be equal to:
Di (ti; ai) =

(mi; si) 2Mi 
 Si :  (s i; sijm i;mi)Ai (aijti;mi; si) > 0
for some (m i; s i) 2M i  S ig :
Fix a pair (ti; ai) with ai 2 Qi (ti) : Notice that for every pair (mi; si) 2 Di (ti; ai) ; the
probability distribution i (ti;mi; si) assigns probability zero to any pair (t i; a i) that does
not belong to the set (T 
Q) i (ti) :12 By making a slight abuse of notation, we now view
i (ti;mi; si) as an element of 
 
(T 
Q) i (ti)

:
Consider now the game in which the players announce their types to the mediator. If
the prole of reports is t the mediator randomly chooses an action prole according to
the probability distribution  (t) : Moreover, the mediator makes small mistakes and his
trembles are described by the sequence fkg1k=1 : Suppose that type ti reveals his type
truthfully and receives the recommendation ai 2 Qi (ti) : Let i (ti; ai) 2 
 
(T 
Q) i (ti)

denote the beliefs of player i: It follows from Equation (17) that the beliefs i (ti; ai) can
be expressed as:
i (ti; ai) =
X
(mi;si)2Di(ti;ai)
di (mi; si; ti; ai)i (ti;mi; si) ;
where di (mi; si; ti; ai) > 0 for every (mi; si) 2 Di (ti; ai) andX
(mi;si)2Di(ti;ai)
di (mi; si; ti; ai) = 1:
In other words, the beliefs i (ti; ai) are a weighted average of the collection of beliefs
(i (ti;mi; si))(mi;si)2Di(ti;ai) : Notice that for every (mi; si) 2 Di (ti; ai) ; action ai is optimal
for player i given the beliefs i (ti;mi; si) : It follows that ai is also optimal given i (ti; ai) :
This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let  be an SCE of G: It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 above that, without loss of
generality, we can assume that the corresponding mediation range is Q and the mediator's
trembles are described by the sequence of functions f^kg1k=k dened in equation (15).13 Let
^i (ti; ai) 2 
 
T 
 Q i (ti) denote the beliefs (derived from f^kg1k=k) of player i when
12Recall that i (ti;mi; si) denotes the beliefs of type ti when he sends message mi and receives si: The
beliefs i (ti;mi; si) are computed using the sequence

M;k
	1
k=1
of completely mixed message strategies.
13The mediation range Q is dened in Section 3. It contains all the actions that are not codominated.
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he reveals his true type ti and receives recommendation ai 2 Qi (ti) : That is, for every
ti 2 Ti; every ai 2 Qi (ti) ; and every (t i; a i) 2
 
T 
 Q i (ti) ;
^i (t i; a ijti; ai) = lim
k!1
p (t i; ti) ^k (a i; aijt i; ti)P
(t0 i;a0 i)2(T
 Q) i(ti)
p
 
t0 i; ti

^k
 
a0 i; aijt0 i; ti
 : (18)
Before constructing the game with communication and the SE that implement the SCE
; we prove a preliminary result. Given the sequence f^kg1k=k ; we show that there exists a
nite sequence f~1; : : : ; ~Lg of functions from T into  (A) that satisfy the following two
properties: (i) ~1 (t) =  (t) for every t 2 T ; and (ii) for every ti 2 Ti; every ai 2 Qi (ti) ;
and every (t i; a i) 2
 
T 
 Q i (ti) ;
^i (t i; a ijti; ai) =
p (t i; ti) ~` (a i; aijt i; ti)P
(t0 i;a0 i)2(T
 Q) i(ti)
p
 
t0 i; ti

~`
 
a0 i; aijt0 i; ti
 ;
where ^i (t i; a ijti; ai) is dened in equation (18) and ` is the smallest integer ` = 1; : : : ; L
for which X
(t0 i;a0 i)2(T
Q) i(ti)
~`
 
a0 i; aijt0 i; ti

> 0:
The functions ~1; : : : ; ~L are constructed inductively. Let ~1 = : We assume that ~`
is given for ` > 1. Let F` denote the set:
F` =

(t; a) 2 T 
 Q : ~` (ajt) = 0
	
:
If the set F` is empty we stop the process and set L = `: Otherwise, for every (t; a) 2 F`
we dene
~`+1 (ajt) = lim
k!1
^k (ajt)
2
" P
(t0;a0)2F`
^k (a
0jt0)
# :
Moreover, for every pair (t; a) 2  T 
 Q nF` we let
~`+1 (ajt) =
1  P
a0:(t;a0)2F`
~`+1 (a
0jt)
ja0 2 A : (t; a0) 2  T 
 Q nF`	 j :
Clearly, the process must stop after nitely many iterations. It is easy to check that
f~1; : : : ; ~Lg satisfy properties (i) and (ii) above. Finally, notice that for every ` = 1; : : : ; L;
every t 2 T; and every a 2 An Q (t) ; ~` (ajt) = 0:
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Consider now the following game with communication
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

: The
set of messages available to player i is:
Mi = Ti  f1; : : : ; Lg ;
where L is the length of the sequence f~1; : : : ; ~Lg dened above. The set of messages Si
is equal to Ai; the set of actions available to player i:
We now describe how the mediator selects an action prole (i.e., the function  :M !
(A)). Let t be the prole of types announced by the players. If t 2 bTnT then the mediator
chooses an action prole randomly according to the probability distribution  (t) : Suppose
now that t 2 T: Let ~`= 1; : : : ; L denote the second largest integer announced by the players
(or the largest integer if this is announced by two or more players). Then the mediator
selects an action prole randomly according to the probability distribution ~~`(t) ; where
~~` is the ~`-th element of the sequence f~1; : : : ; ~Lg :
We now construct an SE (; ) of the game
 
G; (Mi)i2N ; (Si)i2N ; 

that induces :
For every i 2 N; ti 2 Ti; we let Mi (ti) denote the set of messages in which player i reveals
his type truthfully. Formally,
Mi (ti) = f(ti; zi) : zi = 1; : : : ; Lg :
In equilibrium, every type ti 2 Ti of player i 2 N sends the message (ti; 1) :
Mi ((ti; 1) jti) = 1:
Moreover, type ti obeys every recommendation after sending a message mi 2 Mi (ti) :
As we shall show below, after sending a message mi 2 Mi (ti) ; type ti assigns probability
zero to the event that his opponents have lied about their types. That is, type ti assigns
probability zero to the event that type tj of player j 6= i sent a message mj =2 Mj (tj) :
Therefore, it is not necessary to specify the actions that type tj chooses after he sends a
message mj =2Mj (tj) :14
It remains to describe the sequence of completely mixed message strategy proles
M;k
	1
k=1
that converges to M and that determines the players' beliefs. Consider type
ti 2 Ti: We let:
M;ki (mijti) =
8>><>>:
 
1
k
zi 1 if mi = (ti; zi) , where zi = 2; : : : ; L; 
1
k
2L+1
if mi = (t
0
i; zi) ; where t
0
i 6= ti; and zi = 1; : : : ; L;
1  P
m0i 6=(ti;1)
M;ki (m
0
ijti) if mi = (ti; 1) :
14Of course, he will play the action that maximizes his expected payo.
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Clearly, M;ki (mijti) > 0 for every mi 2Mi when k is suciently large.
Given this prole of strategies, it is easy to check that player i = 1; : : : ; n does not have
an incentive to deviate when he announces the message mi: Notice, in fact, that is takes at
least two players to convince the mediator to ignore the function  (recall that  coincides
with ~1 on T ). Thus, player i does not gain by announcing a number zi greater than one.
Moreover, since  is a communication equilibrium, it is optimal for i to reveal his type
truthfully.
Consider now the action stage. Suppose that type ti of player i sent a message mi 2
Mi (ti) and received a recommendation ai 2 Qi (ti) : Given the trembles specied above,
player i's beliefs i (ti;mi; ai) coincide with ^i (ti; ai) dened in equation (18). Clearly, this
implies that it is sequentially rational for i to play ai:
Proof of Theorem 4
Necessity
Fix an SSCE  of a two-person Bayesian game G: Let (G;M1;M2; S1; S2; ) and (; )
be the game with communication and the SE, respectively, that induce : We also let
fM;ki g1k=1 denote the sequence of completely mixed message strategies of player i = 1; 2
(with limk!1 
M;k
i = 
M
i ).
For each player i and each type ti 2 Ti; we let M0i (ti) denote the set message that are
not played in equilibrium by type ti: Formally:
M0i (ti) =

mi 2Mi : Mi (mijti) = 0
	
:
We now use the sequence of mixed strategies fM;ki g1k=1 to partition M0i (ti) as follows.
Two messages mi and m
0
i in M
0
i (ti) belong to the same element of the partition if and only
if
lim
k!1
M;ki (mijti)
M;ki (m
0
ijti)
exists, is nite and dierent from zero. We let fM0i (ti; 1) ; : : : ;M0i (ti; r (ti))g denote the
partition of M0i (ti).
For each player i = 1; 2; we let the set ~Mi be equal to:
~Mi = f(ti; zi) : ti 2 Ti and zi = 0; : : : ; r (ti)g ;
and the set ~M be equal to:
~M =
n
(ti; zi)i=1;2 2 ~M1  ~M2 : zi = 0 for some i = 1; 2
o
:
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Let the function ~ : ~M ! (A) be given by:
~ (aj (t1; 0) ; (t2; 0)) =
X
m2M
X
s2S:(sjm)>0
 Y
i=1;2
Mi (mijti)
!
 (sjm)
 Y
i=1;2
Ai (aijti;mi; si)
!
;
and for every tj 2 Tj and zj = 1; : : : ; r (tj) ;
~ (aj (ti; 0) ; (tj; zj)) =
P
mi2Mi
P
mj2M0j (tj ;zj)
P
s2S:(sjmi;mj)>0
fMi (mijti)
[limk!1
M;kj (mj jtj)P
m0
j
2M0
j (tj ;zj)
M;kj (m0j jtj)
] (sjmi;mj)Ai (aijti;mi; si)Aj (ajjtj;mj; sj)g:
For each player i = 1; 2; we construct a function ~fi :
n
(ti; zi) 2 ~Mi : zi 6= 0
o
! N++ that
satises the following condition. Consider any pair (ti; zi) and (t
0
i; z
0
i) (with zi = 1; : : : ; r (ti)
and z0i = 1; : : : ; r (t
0
i)). Let mi be an element of M
0
i (ti; zi) and m
0
i be an element of
M0i (t
0
i; z
0
i). Suppose that the following limit exists:
lim
k!1
M;ki (mijti)
M;ki (m
0
ijt0i)
:
Then we have:
~fi (ti; zi) < ~fi (t
0
i; z
0
i) if limk!1
M;ki (mijti)
M;ki (m0ijt0i)
=1
~fi (ti; zi) > ~fi (t
0
i; z
0
i) if limk!1
M;ki (mijti)
M;ki (m0ijt0i)
= 0
~fi (ti; zi) = ~fi (t
0
i; z
0
i) otherwise
We do not impose any restriction on the relationship between ~fi (ti; zi) and ~fi (t
0
i; z
0
i)
when the limit dened above does not exist. Notice that the existence and the value of
the limit does not depend on how we choose message mi in M
0
i (ti; zi) and message m
0
i in
M0i (t
0
i; z
0
i).
The domain ~M of the function ~ dened above may be dierent from the domain M
of the function  dened in equation (8). In particular, for some type ti in Ti; the number
r (ti) may be dierent from nj = jTjj (jAjj   1) : For the same reason, the domain of ~fi may
be dierent from the domain of fi of Section 5. To complete the proof of the rst part of
the theorem, we now modify the domains of the functions ~; ~f1, and ~f2 so that they match
the domains of ; f1, and f2; respectively.
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Consider player i = 1; 2; and type ti 2 Ti: Suppose that r (ti) 6= nj: There are two cases
to consider depending on whether r (ti) is larger or smaller than nj: First, suppose that
r (ti) < nj: In this case, we simply add nj  r (ti) new messages: (ti; r (ti) + 1) ; : : : ; (ti; nj) :
Moreover, we assume that the function ~ treats these new messages exactly as message
(ti; 0) : Formally, we assume:
~ (aj (ti; zi) ; (tj; 0)) = ~ (aj (ti; 0) ; (tj; 0)) ;
for every zi = r (ti) + 1; : : : ; nj; for every tj 2 Tj and every a 2 A: Finally, we let
~fi (ti; r (ti) + 1) ; : : : ; ~fi (ti; nj) be arbitrary positive integers.
We now turn to the case r (ti) > nj: Consider a message (ti; zi) ; with zi = 1; : : : ; r (ti) :
We keep (ti; zi) in the set ~Mi if and only if the following condition is satised (if the
condition is violated we delete the message). There exists a pair (tj; aj) 2 Tj  Aj such
that: (i) X
t0i2Ti
X
ai2Ai
p (t0i; tj) ~ (ai; ajj (t0i; 0) ; (tj; 0)) = 0;
(ii) X
ai2Ai
p (ti; tj) ~ (ai; ajj (ti; zi) ; (tj; 0)) > 0;
and (iii) ~fi (ti; zi) 6 ~fi (ti; z0i) for every z0i = 1; : : : ; zi   1; zi + 1; : : : ; r (ti) such thatX
ai2Ai
~ (ai; ajj (ti; z0i) ; (tj; 0)) > 0:
It follows from the denition of ~ and ~fi that at most nj messages can be kept in the
set ~Mi:
Consider now the function ~ dened over the set M and the function ~fi dened over the
set Ti  f1; : : : ; njg : It is easy to verify that ~ is admissible and that ~ and ~f =

~f1; ~f2

satisfy conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 4.
Suciency
Consider a two-person game G: Suppose that there exist an admissible function  and
a function f = (f1; f2) that satisfy conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 4. Let  : T^ ! (A)
be such that  ((t1; 0) ; (t2; 0)) =  (t1; t2) for every (t1; t2) 2 T^ : We now show that  is an
SSCE of G:
Consider the following game with communication
 
G; M1; M2; A1; A2; 

; where Mi is
dened in equation (7) and  : M1 M2 ! (A) is dened as follows. Recall that the set
M dened in equation (8) is a proper subset of M1 M2: For each m = (m1;m2) 2 M; we
let  (m) =  (m) : For m 2   M1  M2 n M , we let  (m) be an arbitrary element of  (A) :
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We claim that the game with communication just described admits an SE with the
following features. Consider player i with type ti: At the message stage he announces mes-
sage (ti; 0) : After announcing this message, type ti obeys any recommendation he receives
from the mediator. Also, suppose that type ti sends (ti; zi) ; with zi 6= 0; and receives a
recommendation ai such thatX
tj2Tj
X
aj2Aj
p (ti; tj)  (ai; ajj (ti; zi) ; (tj; 0)) > 0:
In this case, type ti obeys the recommendation and plays ai: We do not specify the
actions chosen by ti in all other circumstances (see below). It is clear that the strategy
prole described above induces the outcome :
It follows from condition (ii) of Theorem 4 that type ti does not have an incentive to
announce a message dierent from (ti; 0) or to disobey a recommendation that has positive
probability when both players follow their equilibrium strategies at the message stage.
Furthermore, condition (iii) of Theorem 4 implies that after sending (mistakenly) message
(ti; zi) ; zi 6= 0; type ti does not want to disobey the recommendation to play an action ai
that has positive probability when the opponent follows his equilibrium strategy.
It remains to show that after sending message (ti; 0) ; type ti has an incentive to obey the
unexpected recommendations (i.e., those recommendations that have zero probability when
the opponent follows his equilibrium strategy). To do this we need to construct a consistent
system of beliefs. We consider the following sequence of mixed message strategies. Let
f"kg1k=1 be a sequence of positive numbers in the unit interval converging to zero. Along
the sequence, we assume that type ti reports message (ti; zi) ; zi 6= 0; with probability
("k)
fi(ti;zi) : Moreover, type ti announces any message (t
0
i; z
0
i), t
0
i 6= ti and zi = 0; : : : ; nj;
with probability ("k)
nj jTij+1 :
Consider type ti and suppose that he sends message (ti; 0) and receives the unexpected
recommendation ai: The trembles described above guarantee that the beliefs of type ti are
given by i (jti; ai; ; f) (see equation (9)). It then follows from condition (iv) of Theorem
4 that it is optimal for type ti to play action ai:
37
References
[1] Aumann, R. J. (1974): \Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67-96.
[2] Aumann, R. J., and S. Hart (2003): \Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, 71, 1619-1660.
[3] Barany, I. (1992): \Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, 17, 327-340.
[4] Ben-Porath, E. (1998): \Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equi-
librium Outcomes by `Cheap' Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, 80,
108-122.
[5] Ben-Porath, E. (2003): \Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information," Journal
of Economic Theory, 108, 45-71.
[6] Forges, F. (1986): \An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, 54,
1375-1385.
[7] Forges, F. (1990): \Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, 58, 1341-1364.
[8] Gerardi, D. (2004): \Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and In-
complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 104-131.
[9] Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-68): \Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian'
Players," Management Science, 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
[10] Kreps, D. M., and R. Wilson (1982): \Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, 50, 863-
894.
[11] Myerson, R. B. (1982): \Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-
Agent Problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 67-81.
[12] Myerson, R. B. (1986): \Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, 54,
323-358.
[13] Selten, R. (1975): \Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Point
in Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25-55.
[14] Urbano, A., and J. Vila (2002): \Computational Complexity and Communication:
Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, 70, 1893-1927.
38
